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PART

I:

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The Electoral College:

Retention, Reform, or Abolition?

Introductory Remarks

Rarely in the history of our nation has a problem been
so evident, so controversial, and yet remained so unresolved.
The present Congress, as a great many of its predecessor Con

gresses, is trying to solve it, yet as Arthur Krock commented
in the New York Times some years ago,

"The road to reform in

the method of choosing the President and Vice President of the
United States is littered with the wrecks of previous attempts.

Though the inequalities and other defects of the present system
are generally conceded," he said, "it has been protected from
change for more than one hundred years by a mixture of natural
American conservatism where the letter of the Constitution is

concerned and a bipartisan political combination effected by

what some major party politicians believe to be self-interest."*
The actual count shows that in the first century of the Republic,
224 resolutions were introduced in Congress to amend the consti

tutional provisions for electing a President.

In the succeeding

seventy-seven year period, through 1966, another 289 amendments
were offered, making a grand total of 513 to that point in Amer
ican history.

Yet of all these proposals only one has been

1New York Times, March 12, 1950, p. 14.
2

Neal R. Peirce, The People's President: The Electoral
College in American History and the~ Direct Vote Alternative
(New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 151.
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successful and it resulted in the Twelfth Amendment, ratified in

1804, which was significant mainly in its requirement that Pres
idential electors vote .separately for President and Vice President.
"It is claimed that more amendments have been proposed concerning .

the Presidential election than concerning any other single provi

sion of the Constitution,"3- yet the actual electoral college
system of voting has never been altered.

Many of the glaring objections to the existing system are
obvious —

the possibility that State legislatures can take the

popular vote from the people, the problem of faithless electors,
the possibility of minority Presidents, the serious consequences
of fraud in a State that might swing an entire election, the

possibility of a blizzard in part of a State that might swing
that State in favor of one or the other party with the contingent

possibility that this could swing the entire election, and the
undemocratic aspects of contingent elections in the House, with
the invitation such elections offer for political manipulation

and corruption.

However, "most of the reformers over the years

have centered their fire on the general ticket or 'winner-take-

all ' system of casting State electoral votes, with its resultant
disfranchisement of the minority in each State in each election.

This is particularly unfair, critics have said, in large States
where some sections are urban and industrial, others rural and

agricultural, some markedly Republican and some as heavily Dem
ocratic.

)

In the words of Senator Thomas Hart Berton of Missouri

Robert L. Tienken, Proposals to Reform Our Electoral
System (Washington D. C. :
Service, 1968), p. 17.

Library of Congress Legis. Reference
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in 1824,

'To lose their votes is the fate of all minorities, and

it is their duty to submit; but this is not a case of votes lost,

but of votes taken away, added to those of the majority, and

given to a person to whom the minority is opposed.1"
These are many of the,reasons that potential reformers

are citing in their cause and Congress has dealt with the problem
since the early days of the Republic.

Yet there still does not

seem to be general accord either in Congress or throughout the

States on any one of the four major proposed plans of changing
our present system —

the district plan, the proportional plan,

the direct election plan, and the automatic system —

or even

on the preservation of our present system, the Electoral College.

(These plans will be explained in later sections.)
Several Presidential elections during our history have

shown that the electoral college machine is a crude invention
that has never been "well-oiled" and two elections within the

last decade are vivid proof of this problem.

The most outstanding

is the election of 1960 when Kennedy defeated Nixon.

No one is

certain as to which candidate actually did receive the greatest

number of popular votes because of those Alabamians who voted
for something called "unpledged electors" but of even greater

importance is the fact that "a shift of only 4,4 80 popular votes
from Kennedy to Nixon in Illinois, where there were highly

plausible charges of fraud, and 4,491 in Missouri, would have

given neither man an electoral majority and thrown the decision

Peirce, People's President, p. 152.
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into the House of Representatives."^
Peirce concludes:

Thus it is not certain that Kennedy honestly
won an electoral college majority, despite
the history books and his inauguration; it is
not clear that he won even a popularvote plur
ality; it is equally unclear that NixonWas--really elected (in 1960) either by the ptapular

or electoral counts, and what would^have happened

had the whole mess been left to the House is too

^

ghastly to think about6

(because of the particular composition of the House in 1960).
The only thing that is clear, as Neal Peirce points out
in his book, The People's President, is that "the 1960 election

summed up the evils of the Electoral College in our times."
is his indictment:

First the 1960 elections showed once again the
irrational, chance factors that decide a close
election, when the shift of a few votes can

throw huge blocks of electoral votes in one

direction or the other. Secondly, it under
scored the danger of fraud deciding a Presi
dential election, because Illinois, where the
most ballot disputes arose, was the State that

almost decided the entire election.
Third, it
showed the potentially decisive role that a
narrowly based regional or splinter party (the
unpledged electors) can play in the choice of a

President and how the system actually encourages
independent elector blocs. Fourth, the election
showed how a faceless elector, chosen to carry out
a specific function, could suddenly break his
trust and try to determine the choice of the

chief executive for 180 million Americans,

and lastly, the election showed that as long
as individual States have carte blanche in /

deciding how Presidential electors will be^chosen,
it may be difficult and sometimes impossible to
compile accurate national popular vote totals
(as in Alabama in 1960) and to learn whom the

majority of Americans really wanted to be their
President.7

6Ibid., p. 10.

7Ibid., pp. 10, 11.

Here
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The election of 1968 could also have been disasterous

although it was not as breathtaking as the 1960 election.

How

ever, with three condidates striving for the Presidency (Wallace

being the strongest third party candidate in many years)

the

nation could have elected a "minority" President or worse yet
have thrown the election into the House with its many previously
mentioned

evils.

Statesmen throughout the history of our country have
considered this:

Obviously, this is a situation that ought to be
rectified, and for the better part of two centuries
American statesmen from Madison and Jefferson

through Thomas Hart Berton to Lyndon B. Johnson
have been trying to work out something better.
None of the solutions commonly advanced, however,

would have made much improvement for our time.8
However, the American public, through agencies, organizations,
and especially through their representatives in Congress must

promote a workable, and acceptable solution.

Whether this

solution will be one of permanence or of brevity remains to be
resolved.

stated:

Past President Johnson, in regard to this fact, has

"The potential of paralysis implicit in these conditions

constitutes an indefensible folly in our responsible society in
these times.

Common sense impels, duty requires us to act —
g

and to act now without delay."

8Ibid., p. 11.
9

Message from the President of the United States, 89th

Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives
p.2.

(February 1, 1965),

PART

II:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Historical Background

The United States Constitution originally defined the
Electoral College:

The American Presidency and the electoral college
method of choosing our Chief Executive were first

defined in the federal constitution, written by
the Constitutional Convention, which met in Phil
adelphia between May 25 and September 17, 1789.
The 55 delegates from 12 States (Rhode Island
refused to participate) had won their liberty —
and their first sense of nationhood —

in the

crucible of revolution.10
From the very beginning of the Convention there was much

controversy as to what the role of the "sovereign" States would

be in this new Union and how each would be represented.

The

large States favored the Virginia Plan which based representation
in the new federal government on population whereas the small

States favored the New Jersey Plan which was based on the prin
ciple of equal representation for all the States in Congress.
The result of this controversy was the famous "Connecticut

Compromise" which created a bicameral legislature; one House to

be based on population and the other to give equal representation
to each State.

At the Convention the founding fathers were in agreement
that the President and Vice President should be elected officials,
but:

the problem of large versus small-State power appeared
again in the Convention's debates on how the Presi
dent should be elected.

But the bulk of these debates

10Peirce, People's President, p. 28.
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took place after the Connecticut Compromise had
been adopted and they lacked the crisis atmos
phere of the discussion and vote on Congressional
representation.
The alignments, though, were sim
ilar.
The nationalist group favored a direct vote
or some other system accurately reflecting popula

tion distribution.

Small State delegates feared

that they would have no significant vote, under
these circumstances,
Executive.

in the choice of a Chief

•*•

Many varied proposals were submitted for consideration
and the more significant included among them were:

direct pop

ular election, election by Congress, and election by state leg
islatures.

As noted above, there were inherent difficulties in

the methodology of election because of State size but each of
these proposed methods was widely opposed by numerous members
of the Convention for a variety of other reason.

Considering the times and the atmosphere of the Consti
tutional Convention one can easily recognize> that the direct pop
ular election proposal was doomed from the start.

Many of the

members seemed to feel that the people, in general, were not

capable of determining the character, integrity, and qualifi
cations of the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates.

This, compounded with the fact that communication during those

days was slow, inadequate, and unreliable destined this plan for
failure.

Election of the President by Congress was also a very
controversial issue because the founding fathers were desirous

of creating and maintaining an independent executive.

Thus,

11Ibid. , p. 36.
In this context, when President can be used inter

changeably with the idea of executive office (s), meaning both
President and Vice President, just the President will be named.

-9-

they rejected this plan so as to relieve the Chief Executive
from dependence upon the wants and desires of Congress.

Mad

ison was one of the strongest opponents of this plan because

of its potential in undermining the system of "separation of
powers."
Election by the State legislatures, because of reasons

similar to those of election by Congress, was also opposed.
The executive, if elected in this manner, would have been
unable to avoid undue pressures exerted by the State legisla
tures.

Again the Convention was deadlocked and an eleven man

committee was appointed to study the problem- and hopefully
develop an answer.

Eventually the Committee of Eleven, as it was called,

developed a plan of election by intermediate electors which
became known as the Electoral College.

(The Electoral College

will be discussed fully in Part III.)

The following plan was submitted to the convention and

passed (with minor changes) because it was perceived by many
as the lesser of several evils:

First, each State would have as many Presidential
electoral votes as it had Representatives and
Senators combined.

This carried the Connecticut

Compromise over into the presidential election
and gave the small States some relative advantage
because of the

two extra electoral

votes

corres

ponding to the number of Senators, regardless of
how small a State's population might be.
But it
must be noted that this compromise was not con
sidered crucial at the time.

It had not been

sufficient to mollify the small States when
attached to a proposal for election of the Pres

ident in Congress.
At no time after the Committee
of Eleven reported was any mention made on the
Convention floor of the supposed advantage to

-10-

small States of the Senatorial 'counterpart'
votes.

Nor was this apparent concession men

tioned in the subsequent ratifying conventions.
What was considered a major concession to
the small States was the provision of the inter
mediate elector plan which stipulated that in the
event there was no majority in the electoral
college,

the choice of the President would be

transferred to the Senate, where each State
would have equal voting power.
(The convention

subsequently voted to shift the contingent elec
tion responsibility to the House of Representa
tives, but the provision for equality of State
voting power was preserved.) The delegates
apparently believed that many of the Presiden
tial electors would vote for men from their own

State and region, making a final choice in the

electoral college unlikely and throwing most
elections into Congress.
The small States T.:ere
expected to benefit further from the provision
that the Senate (or later the House), when
called upon to choose the President, would be

required to choose from among the five persons
who received the most electoral votes.
There
was a good chance that one or more of the five

would be small State candidates.

Roger Sherman

of Connecticut, who had been a member of the
Committee of Eleven, told the Convention that

if the small States 'had the advantage in the
Senate's deciding among the five highest can
didates, the large States would have in fact
the nomination of these candidates.1

Madison

subsequently wrote that the Presidential elec

tion provisions were 'the result of compromise
between the larger and smaller States, giving
to the latter the advantage of selecting a
President from the candidates, in consideration
of the former in selecting the candidates from

the people.'13

Thus the electoral college was created^but one addition
al compromise was needed.

This was in relation to the actual

electors and how they were to act:
The authors of the Constitution intended that

each State should choose its most distinguished
citizens as electors.

Once the electors had

•

legislature desired, it was expected that they

-•^Peirce, People' s President, pp. 36, 37.
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would deliberate and vote as

individuals in

choosing the President.14
However, the criteria for the selection of the electors

have not always been as high as the founding fathers might have
wished:

Over the years since then, the weight of pol
itical reality has crushed, one by one, the
frail hopes of the idealists among the Founding
Fathers for the ineffable scheme they devised.
If there remained a vestige of possibility that
electors might yet be chosen with an eye to their
capacity to exercise superior judgment, it was
made a mockery by the 194 8 Electoral College of
Michigan.
Faced on their voting day by six
vacancies in their ranks, the remaining thirteen
electors fell to the task, as prudence requires
and the State law permits, of filling them.
They descended to the streets of Lansing, rounded
up half-a-dozen passers-by, and swore them in.
Their qualifications
— they belonged to the

right party.15
At first, State legislatures chose electors as they
were empowered to do.

However, by 1804, most of the electors

were being elected by direct popular vote.

There were several

plans in use and one of the most favorable early plans of
choosing the electors was the district plan:

one elector was

chosen by the voters of each Congressional district and two
were elected by those of the State at large.

Eventually the district system was gradually abandoned
for the unit vote system whereby the State delivered its entire
electoral vote to the Presidential and Vice Presidential can

didates that carried the State.

This eliminated the splitting

l^Tienken, Proposals to Reform, p. 15.

1501iver Jansen (ed.), American Heritage: The Magazine
of History, Vol. XIII, No. 6,
Publishing Co., 1962), p. 94.

(New York: American Heritage
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of the State's electoral vote between two or more candidates.

States which employed a unit vote (or general ticket system)
were able to assign all their electoral votes to the candidate
receiving the highest popular vote,' with the result that these

states were able to exert greater influence in presidential
election.

When the first States began using the "en bloc"
,?

system the remaining States were impelled to convert to the

unit vote system in order to maintain an equal footing.

Every

State, since 1892, has used our present system.

In the early days of the Union the practise of shifting

the method of choosing Presidential electors from year to year
for the benefit of ruling circles in each State was one of the

most criticized aspects of the electoral system.
In 1826 a Senate report authored by Thomas Hart
Benton noted that the various

States'

methods

of choosing electors 'change with a suddeness
which defies classification,' a practise pro
ducing 'pernicious effects.'
The case was put
even stronger by Senator Mahlon Dickerson of
New Jersey in 1818.
'The discordant systems
adopted by the different States,' he said, 'are
the subject of constant fluctuation and change —
of frequenc, ha^ty and rash experiment — esta
blished, altered, abolished, re-established,
according to the dictates of the interest, amb
ition, the whim or caprice, of party and
faction.'16

However, a much greater storm was rapidly approaching
on the American horizon which would soon bring doom to the

original method of election,and almost,to the country.

The

original method of election lasted only four elections after
its ratification by the States and its alteration was the
result of the Jefferson-Burr incident in the election of 1800.

16 Peirce,

People's President, p.

75.
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Political parties were one thing that many of the
founding fathers disdained most and had hoped would never
develop.

Yet by 1800, two political parties (the Federalists

and the Republicans) had developed and were beginning to
operate rather efficiently.

In previous elections accident

and careful design (along with underdeveloped political parties)
had preempted the possibility of a tie vote in the Electoral

College between any two Presidential candidates.

However, in

the close race for President the Federalist Party electors each
cast one vote for Thomas Jefferson, their party's understood

choice for President, and one vote for Aaron Burr, their party's
understood choice for Vice President.

As it happened the Fed

eralist "ticket" won but neither man was elected President since

they were voted for jointly and not by separate, distinct ballots
for President and Vice President.

Thus the election devolved

into the House of Representatives where it became stalled.

For

a time it appeared as if the country would be without a Pres

ident because of much "wheeling and dealing" by a lame duck
Congress.

The actual election was in suspense for more than

two months because of the political construction of the House

but Jefferson finally emerged as President on the thirty-sixth
ballot.

However, the inadequacies of the system became obvious
A

and the dangers were threefold:

First, there might be a tie vote, as occurred in
1800 — bringing an inferior man like Burr peril
ously close to the Presidency through the kind of
intrigue and cabal the founding fathers had hoped
most to prevent.
Second, if some electoral votes
were withheld from the man intended for Vice Pres

ident, there was a chance that the opposing party's
candidate for President might win the Vice Presi
dency.

This occurred with Jefferson's election as

-14-

Vice President in 1796 over Pinckney, the man the'
winning Federalists favored that year.
And third,
the minority could, if it so chose, switch some
of its votes to the Vice Presidential candidate

of the opposing party and thus make him President.1^
As a result Congress proposed the Twelfth Amendment which
included a method that would alleviate such incidents.

Finally,

after several unsuccessful attempts, both the House and the Senate

acted favorably (with a necessary two-thirds majority) on the pro
posal and it was submitted to the States on December 8, 180 3.
States ratified with unexpected rapidity, and the Amendment was

declared in effect September 25, 1804, in time for that year's
election.

i ft

°

The text of the 12th Amendment —

which, with slight

changes, remains the law of the land today —

effected the

following changes from the original Constitution:
1.

The Presidential electors must vote separately
for President and Vice President,

instead of

casting two undifferentiated votes.
2.

If an election is thrown into the House of Repre

sentatives because no candidate has a majority, the
House shall pick from the three top electoral vote

recipients, rather than the five stipulated in the
Constitution.

3.

If the House is called on to pick the President and
does not make a selection by March 4

(this date was

17Ibid., p. 71.

^Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Consti
tution of the United States During the First Century of Its His
tory, (Washington, 1897), p.79.

The
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changed to January 20 by the Twentieth Amendment,
ratified in 1933), then the new Vice President will

become President.

The original Constitution had no

comparable provisions.

4.

A

A majority of electoral votes is also required for
election as Vice President.

The original Constitu

tion had simply provided that the person receiving
the second highest number of electoral votes, regard
less of whether they constituted a majority, would
be elected Vice President.

The Twelfth Amendment

left the contingent election for Vice President in

the Senate.

The authors of the original Constitution

had contemplated throwing the Vice Presidential

choice into the Senate only if there was a tie for
that office.

5.

The age, citizenship and residence requirements of
a Vice President are to be the same as those for a

President.

The original Constitution was silent on

this point.^
Thus the Electoral College system of electing the Pres
ident and Vice President evolved from the Constitutional Conven

tion as a vague outline that was created from a shroud of con

troversy, compromise, and even fear.

The Founding Fathers knew

that it was not perfect but were interested in a scheme that
would work for a tie

and also one that could be "sold" in the

immediate context of 1787
19

(as this Constitutional document still

Peirce, People's President, p. 74.
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had to be accepted by the several States).
However, James Madison,

the "father of the Constitu

tion," perhaps was as frank about the problem as any of the
framers could ever be when he wrote some thirty-six years
later:

The difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process
for appointing the Executive Organ of a Government
such as that of the U.S., was deeply felt by the
Convention; and as the final arrangement took place
in the latter stages of the session, it was not

exempt from a degree of the hurrying influence pro
duced by fatique and impatience in all such bodies;
tho' the degree was much less than usually prevails
in them.20

o

20

Ibid., p. 52.

PART

III:

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE SYSTEM

The Electoral College System

The Electoral College derives its "raison d'etre" from

the Constitution of the United States in Article II, Section I,
clause 3.

However, this entire provision (because of the elec

tion of 18 00) has been superseded by the Twelfth Amendment which
provides that:

The electors shall meet in their respective States
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom,

at least,

shall not be an inhabitant of

the same State with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and
in distinct ballots the person voted for as VicePresident, and they shall make distinct lists of all
persons voted for as President, and of all persons
voted for as Vice-President,

and of the number of

votes for each, which lists they shall sign and
certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the Gov
ernment of the United States, directed to the Pres
ident of the Senate; —
the President of the Senate

shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and the
votes shall then be counted; — the person having
the greatest number of votes for President, shall
be the President, if such number be a majority of
the whole number of electors appointed; and if no
person have such majority, then from the persons

having the highest numbers not exceeding three on
the list of those voted for as President, the
House of Representatives shall choose immediately,
by ballot, the President.
But in choosing the
President, the votes shall be taken by States, the
representation from each State having one vote.; a
quorom for this purpose shall consist of a member
or members from two thirds of the States, and a

majority of all the States shall be necessary to
a choice. And if the House of Representatives
shall not choose a President whenever the right
of choice shall devolve upon them, [before the
fourth day of March next following,] [this was
changed to noon on the twentieth day of January
by the Twentieth Amendment ratified in 1933] , then
the Vice-President shall act as President, as in
the case of the death or other constitutional
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disability of the President. -- The person having
the greatest number of votes as Vice-President,
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a

majority of the whole number of electors appointed,
and if no person have a majority, then from the
two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall

choose the Vice-President; a quorom for the purpose
shall consist of two thirds of the whole number of

Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall

be necessary to a choice.
But no person constitu
tionally ineligible to the office of President shall

be elig^Jle to that of Vice-President of the United
States.

In addition to this procedure the Twenty-Third Amendment
provided the Distract of Columbia with three electoral votes.

According to the Constitution the electors are chosen

in any manner that each State legislature directs, which at present
is by direct popular vote, but could be in any other manner pre
scribed by the State legislatures.

These electors in turn elect

the President and Vice-President of the United States.

However,

the salient issue is that the people of the United States do not
(and never have) directly elect the two most important officials
in our country but have only an indirect voice in their election.

Each State's electors act as the voice of the people.

These

electors are known as "colleges" within each State and collect

ively are known as "the Electoral College."
The present system, as now employed, has four methods

of electing the Presidential and Vice Presidential electors.22
The first is the Presidential short ballot where the names of

only the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates are

printed on the ballot in the general election.

This method

21u.S., Constitution, Amendment 12.

22Peirce, People's President, pp. 119-121.
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implies that the unknown electors who are chosen will be expected

to vote for candidates whose names appeared on the ballot.
Another method has both the names of the Presidential and

Vice Presidential candidates and the names of the electors printed
on the same ballot.

This also implies that a pledge exists that

the electors will vote for the candidate with whom their names

are joined.
The third method has only the names of the electors on
the ballots.

These electors are unpledged and if elected in the

general election, are not obliged or even expected to vote for
any particular candidate.

They vote as individuals for the can- •

didate of their choice which closely resembles the manner that
was established in 1789, when the framers of the Constitution

wanted the electors to be independent, conscientious selectors
of the President and Vice President.
The

fourth method combines methods

two and three and

presents the voters with a list of both pledged and unpledged

electors.

This method is the least popular of the four but was

the one used by the State of Alabama in the close election of

1960.

Much of the controversy as to whether Kennedy or Nixon

was the actual popular choice arose out of the use of this plan
because no one was

(or is)

sure as to how to count Alabama's

votes in that particular election.

Each plan functions with a degree of success that is
mainly dependent on what each individual State hopes to accomplish.

Arguments in Favor of the Present System

Senator John F. Kennedy expressed the basic philosophy
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of the proponents of retaining our present unit vote system when
he

stated in 1956:

, It is not only the unit vote for the Presidency
we are talking about, but a whole solar system
of governmental power.

If it is proposed to

change the balance of power of one of the ele

ments of the solar system, it is necessary to
consider the others.23
Senator Kennedy's "solar system" refers to the elements in the

American governmental structure —

the Presidency, Congress,

the Supreme Court, and State and local governments.

Arguments in Favor of the Electoral College

The proponents of this philosophy and of retaining our

Electoral College system present the following arguments:24
1.

Our existing system has successfully endured the
test of time since it came into existence in 1789,

with only minor amendments adjusting it.
2.

The electoral system has given us only three

minority Presidents; that is, Presidents who had

less popular votes in the general election than
their chief opponent.

3.

Our present system gives ample representation to
both the small and the large States without infring
ing upon the rights of either.

4.

The electoral system provides adequate expression of
the metropolitan vote in Presidential elections to
counter-balance the rural influence allegedly evident
in Congress.

5.

The Electoral College has had very few problems in

24Alexander M. Bickel, "The Case for the Electoral College,"
The New Republic,

(January 28, 1967), pp. 15-16.
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dealing with "splinter" parties, thus strength
ening our age-old two' party system.
6.

The electoral vote exaggeration of the winner's mar

gin serves as apparent national approval and accept
ance of the newly elected candidates by the people.
7.

No other method has found general acceptance by the
people; therefore, we should not abandon a system
that has proven its dependability.

8.

The present system affords organized minority groups
attention that they might not necessarily receive.

9.

Both parties must and do have similar public appeal,
thus limiting extremism in our government.

Comments

The proponents argue that our present system has oper

ated effectively for almost two centuries, however, we did have
a

crisis

situation in 1800 and a

near miss

in 196 0.

We have also

had candidates who received less votes than their opponents for
President

(three times).

Whether or not such incidents occurred

only three times is irrelevant; what is important is that we have

had minority Presidents.

Is this the manner in which our demo

cratic system shou.ld function or should it be designed so that
this

could never occur?

If the present system gives ample representation to both

large and small States why have candidates in modern times con
centrated their campaigns in the large "pivotal" States?
answer is simple:

The

large States influence elections more than

small States and thus the value of the vote in large States is
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worth more.

Computer analysis has proven this.25

It is also possible —

maybe not probable —

for a can

didate to be elected President and have carried only twelve of
our fifty States.

Appendix A in this study lists the twelve

states and the number of electoral votes to which each is entit

led as of the 1960 census.

These twelve States possess the 270

electoral votes necessary to elect the President and Vice Presi
dent of the United States.

(There are 538 electoral votes and

a candidate needs only one more than half to be elected.)

This

simply means that a candidate can carry these twelve States,
lose the remaining thirty-eight, and still become President.

The argument concerning the counter-balancing effect —
adequate representation of the metropolitan vote in Presidential

elections to counter-balance the rural influence allegedly evi
dent in Congress —

is rapidly losing its validity as a result of

recent Supreme Court decisions.

(Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. San

ders , and Gray v. Sanders) concerning reapportionment.26
The present system does adequately handle "splinter"

parties and does limit extremism in our government but in doing
so does it give a meaningful choice or just limit us to choosing
between "Tweedledum and Tweedledee,"

(although the election of

1968 tends to invalidate this "splinter" party argument)?

Is

A

this what we want from our democratic system?

However, it does

not seem likely that if we changed our present system of electing
the President it in turn would alter the method by which our two-

25Peirce, People's President, pp. 362, 363.

26Ibid., pp. 240-248.
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party system operates.

Most probably it would function in the

same manner under any of the proposed plans of constitutional
change.

The exaggeration in the electoral vote gives the appear
ance that the newly elected President is approved, accepted, and
backed by the entire nation.

This can be advantageous to our

newly elected President as it adds to his necessary legitimacy.
If the Electoral College does nothing else, it does strengthen
the solidarity that the world's greatest nation must possess in
order to maintain its position of leadership.

Organized minorities under our present system do receive

attention that they might not ordinarily receive under another
method.

Should candidates be dictated by the whimsical desires

of minority groups in the populous, key States only because their
bloc vote might be the deciding factor of the election results in
that State?

Is it fair, is it honest, is it democratic, is it
to the best interest of anyone, in fact, to place
such a premium on a few thousand labor votes, or
Italian votes, or Irish votes, or Negro votes, or
Polish votes, or Jewish votes, or Communist votes,
or big-city-machine votes, simply because they
happen to be located in two or three large, ind

ustrial, pivotal States?27
But, on the other hand, is there any other way in which minority

groups can express themselves and make their voices heard?

The

author's answer to this is definitely yes because of the "broker

theory" of politics and a candidate's desire to win.

2ft

27Richard L. Strout, "So You Think You Vote for a Presi
dent," The Christian Science Monitor,
28

(January 16, 1966).

For a complete discussion of the "broker theory" see:
The Makers of Public Policy, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1965).
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If a new proposal is to be adopted, it must be one that
will be acceptable not only to the large, industrial States but
also to the small, rural ones.

This is the problem —

to develop

and adopt a plan that has the general acceptance of the citizens
of all fifty States and the District of Columbia (or at least
two thirds of the States, but preferably all fifty).

The Elec

toral College will remain in existence as long as this is not
accomplished.

Arguments Against the Present System
As mentioned earlier many proposals have been advanced

in regard to reforming or abolishing the Electoral College and

although each has failed they have all served to point out the
evils and weaknesses of the present system.

The following is a

list of these "evils" and weaknesses as expressed by the pro

ponents for change:29
1.

There is no uniform method of choosing Presidential
electors; each State elects the electors as it sees fit.

2.

There exist

in the electoral system "independent" or

unpledged electors who are not legally bound to cast
their vote in the manner directed by the people.

3.

The Electoral College system tends to restrict
national campaigns to a dozen or so key pivotal States.
In conjunction with this the "winner-take-all" system
tends to restrict the choice of Presidential candi

dates to men who are from the large pivotal States
29

Peirce, People's President, pp. 253, 254.
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that possess a large block of electoral votes.
4.

The founding fathers never intended the unit vote

system to evolve into a system whereby a candidate
receives all the electoral votes of a State regard

less of his majority of victory.

A corollary argu

ment concerns a candidate receiving credit for his

opponent's votes in the States he carries but not

receiving any credit for his own votes in the States
his opponents carry.

5.

Each State, regardless of its size, is allowed to

cast only one vote for President when the election
devolves upon the House of Representatives and the
elected candidate from here may not even be the

choice of the majority of the American people.

6.

A possibility exists that the President and Vice
President may not be of the same party if neither
candidate qualifies in the general election.

7.

The Electoral College system has permitted the elec
tion of fourteen "minority" Presidents; that is,
Presidents who did not receive at least fifty percent

of the popular vote cast in the general election and
three of whom had less votes than their major opponent,

8.

The electoral College permits and invites control and

domination by organized minority groups within the

key States, and encourages the development and solid
arity of religious, economic, and racial blocks within
these

9.

States.

The final count of the electoral vote does not always
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accuragely reflect the popular vote of the people

Comments

There is a conflicting trend of thought in many argu

ments for and against the present system.

Custom and tradition

have greatly altered the operation of the system as the founding
fathers envisioned.

Some of the criticisms are directed at the

original system, like the method of choosing electors and how
the electors are to function, and others at aspects of its dev

elopment. However eager conservatives may"be to point to the
original document and justify the selection process of electors
and the actions of the electors, they realize that these argu

ments are weak.

Not even they could justify the selection of

electors by State legislatures, which would be perfectly legal
according to the Constitution.

Since 1796 with the birth of

the first faithless elector much criticism has been directed
toward that practise also.

He was picked as one of the two

Federalist electors in Pennsylvania, so that everyone expected
he would vote for Adams, the Federalist candidate.
he decided to cast his vote for Jefferson.

But instead

An exasperated Fed

eralist complained in the United States Gazette, "What, do I
choose Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or
Thomas Jefferson shall be President?

No!

I choose him to act,

not to think."30
That Presidential campaigns tend to be restricted to a
30

Peirce, People's President, p. 64.
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dozen or so key pivotal States is a "political fact of life" that
has been discussed previously.

(See Appendix A.)

This results

from the unit rule plan that has been used in every State in
every Presidential election since 1892.

All of the reformers

have been quite interested in rectifying this particular evil
present in the Electoral College system.

What consolation is it

to a candidate to have carried thirty-eight small and medium

sized States and yet have lost the election to his opponent who
carried the twelve key States?

This unit vote system has another major disadvantage —
it credits all the electoral votes to the candidate that carries

the State regardless of his margin of victory.

The operation of

the general ticket system is said to result in massive disfran

chisement of minority voters because their votes are taken away
from the man for whom they were cast and actually given to the
winner (since the winner gets all the electoral votes of a State
0

that he carries).

A study of the impact of the general ticket system
on a

small number of States demonstrates its inher

ent inequality.

For example, in the neighboring

States of Illinois and Indiana in 196 0, Nixon won
a total of 3,554,108 votes to Kennedy's 3,330,204.
But Kennedy had narrowly won Illinois, thus receiv
ing her twenty-seven electoral votes, while Nixon

won a strong victory in Indiana, bringing him thir
teen electoral votes.

Thus the two State electoral

vote was twenty-seven for Kennedy, thirteen for

Nixon —

or 67.5 percent for Kennedy, based on only

48.4 percent of the two States' popular vote total.

Reviewing the operation of the general ticket system
half a century ago, one observer said:

31Ibid., p. 138.
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A plurality or majority in one section may, it
is true, at times be conteracted by one in another
section, and thus the net result be a rude approx
imation to fairness, taking the country as a whole;
but this theory of averages may not work constantly,
and the steady suppression of minority conviction
in a State is an undisputed evil.32
The phenomenon of the House choosing a new Chief Executive
has occurred twice in our history —

the elections of 1800 and .1824

and has come dangerously close several other times.

Except for

the founding fathers, few Americans have ever found much to commend

in the system of contingent election in the House.

This general

disdain was eloquently expressed by Senator Oliver P. Morton of
Indiana in an 1873 Senate speech:

The objections to this Constitutional provision
need only to be stated, not argued.
First, its
manifest injustice.
In such an election each
State is to have but one vote.
Nevada, with
its 42,000 population, has an equal vote with
New York, having 104 times as great a popula
tion.
It is a mockery to call such an election
just, fair or republican.
Morton showed that under the apportionment then in effect, fortyfive members of the House, drawn from nineteen States, could con

trol an election in a House then consisting of 292 members repre

senting thrity-seven States.

The nineteen States with an aggregate

1870 population of a fraction over eight million people would be

able to outvote eighteen States with an aggregate population of
thirty million.

The comparable figures based on the 19 60 census

showed that seventy-six members of the House, drawn from twentysix States, could elect a President in a House of 435 members

representing fifty States.

32Ibid., p. 138.

The twenty-six States with an aggre-
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gate population of 30,7 million people would be able to outvote

twenty-four States with a total population of 14 8.6 million.33
The possibility of a further and maybe more complex
problem, because of America's position as a world leader, arises
from the fact that the Senate and not the House elects the Vice

President when the election is not decided in the general elec
tion.

If the House and Senate were not controlled by the same

party there is a good possibility that the new President and

Vice President would be of different political parties.

This

could have a devastating impact on a nation such as ours.

It has been shown that the existing system does not

clearly reflect the results of the popular vote.

Not only does

it cast an untrue picture of the vote, but it may also, as it
has previously done, result in the election of a minority Pres
ident.

This fact is not new to the American people; it has

occurred fourteen times since this system's inception.

Appen

dix B contains a list of the fourteen minority Presidents (that
is, Presidents who did not have at least fifty percent of the
popular vote)

—

three of whom had less votes than their chief

opponent.

The large States are not only conducive to strong twoparty systems but also to the undue pressure of organized minor

ities.

In a well-balanced two-party State where the result of

an election is never decided until the last vote is cast, the

large minority groups that cast their votes as a block (generally)
can and do exert an enormous degree of influence, and they may

33Ibid., pp. 132, 133.
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often turn the result of an election end for end, even in the
closing minutes of the campaign.

Critics who support pressure

group politics would consider this a healthy aspect of American
democracy and those who also believe in the present electoral

system would go so far as to say that this healthy condition
would abate in the absence of pressure group politics.

Actu

ally this may not be healthy since it tends to elevate the
value of fraud in an election. It also seems as if the second

argument is weak since politicians are out to win and would still
try to reach as many block votes as possible.

The percentage of electoral votes received by a candi
date on a nationwide basis rarely coincides with his percentage

of the popular vote.
tion

Since 1916 there has been only one elec

that of 194 8 — in which the winning Presidential can

didate failed to run at least ten percentage points better in
the Electoral College than he did in the popular vote.

There

are three reasons for this situation:34
1. The general ticket (or unit vote) system, in which
all the electoral votes of a State are credited to

whichever elector slate receives a plurality of the
State vote.

Minority votes in a State are washed

out completely in the national electoral vote count.
2.

The distortions caused by the existence of the "Sen
atorial" electoral votes in each State.

3.

The fact that each State casts the number of elec
toral votes accorded it in the national apportion-

34

Ibid., p. 137.
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ment, regardless of how few or how many citizens
actually go to the polls.

Thus many of the weaknesses and disliked elements of

the present system have been presented.

President Nixon in a

message to Congress expressed the convictions of many Americans
when he

said:

One hundred and sixty-five years ago, Congress
and the several States adopted the Twelfth Amend
ment to the United States Constitution in order

to cure certain defects — underscored by the
election of 1800 —
in the electoral college

method of choosing a President.
Today, our pres
idential selection mechanism once again requires

overhaul to repair defects spotlighted by the
circumstances of 1968.35

Robert L. Tienken, an acknowledged authority in this
field, wrote:

Since January 6, 1797, when Representative William
L. Smith of South Carolina offered in Congress the
first Constitutional Amendment proposing reform of

our procedure for electing a President, hardly a
session of Congress has passed without the intro
duction of one or more resolutions of this char

acter.36
And yet, 172 years later, our current President is still asking
for reform.

Of the many plans presented there are four general

themes or plans and they will now be examined.

35The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol
5, No. 8, Monday, February 24, 1969, pp. 290,291.
36
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SECTION

I:

THE AUTOMATIC VOTE

SYSTEM

Proposals to Reform the Present System

The Automatic Vote System

o

This plan is sometimes called the "minimal proposal"

since it would effect the least change in the present Electoral
College system.

It was first introduced in Congress by Repre

sentative Charles E. Haynes of Georgia in 1826 and over the
years has become known as "the automatic system" since it would

simply write the general ticket or "winner-take-all" system of
casting State electoral votes directly into the Constitution
and abolish the actual office of elector.

The automatic system would provide by Constitutional
Amendment for the automatic operation of the present system.
The Electoral College and the electoral vote would be retained
but the person and the office of the elector would be abolished.
Each State would be entitled to a number of electoral votes that

is equal to its total number of Senators and Representatives in
Congress.

The electoral vote of each State would be credited to

the candidate receiving the greatest number of popular votes of
that State.

If no candidate receives a majority of the electoral vote

then both Houses of Congress sitting jointly and voting as indi
viduals would choose the President from the candidates, not
exceeding three, with the highest number of electoral votes.

Three-fourths of the total number of Senators and Representa

tives would constitute a quorum and the person receiving the
37
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greatest number of votes would be declared President.

The Vice

President would be elected at the same time and in the same man38
ner.

Another proposal, almost identical in nature and content

to the automatic is known as the "pledged elector" proposal.

The

only difference is that the office of elector would be retained

and the elector would be required by Constitutional mandate to
pledge his vote to his party's choice for President and Vice Pres
ident.

Both of these plans will be discussed jointly in the name

of the "automatic vote system" as their advantages and disadvan
tages are basically the same.

Advantages of the Automatic Vote System

Proponents of this plan have cited the following as fav

orable aspects of the automatic vote system:39
1.

The automatic system would insure that all the elec
toral votes of each State went to the candidate who
carried that State.

2.

The automatic vote plan would eliminate the "indep
endent elector.

3.

This plan would preserve the unit rule system and
change it from a matter of custom to Constitutional
statute.

4.

The automatic method would provide that the election

of the President, whenever necessary, would devolve
38
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upon both Houses of Congress with each member having
one vote, thus eliminating the undemocratic contingent

election as it now exists in the House of Represen
tatives .

5.

The political balance between urban and rural influ
ence

6.

would be preserved.

The automatic plan is a minimal change, preserving
the basic mature of our present system and the prin
cipal of federalism.

Comments

That this system would eliminate the "independent" and
"faithless" electors is undisputable since it would be unconsti

tutional to do otherwise if this proposal became a reality.

It

would also insure that all the electoral votes of each State
went to the candidate who carried that State since it would

freeze the unit rule into the Constitution.

However, the unit

rule is one of the aspects of the present system that potential
reformers (this author included) have most vehemently opposed
and therefore would not actually remove the present "evils" of
the system but in actuality would give "aid and comfort to the
enemy."

Apparently the only other favorable reform included in

this plan, beyond eliminating "faithless" and "independent"
electors, is the fact that it takes the contingent election out

of the House, where each State has only one vote, c:nd places it

in the hands of a joint session of Congress.

Once in this joint
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session of Congress, the large States would be able to voice
their choice for President with emphasis in direct relation to
their numbers.

Each State would have as many votes as it has

Senators and Representatives instead of the previous undemocratic
one vote per State.

This aspect may not be in accordance with

a strict interpretation of federalism (States' rights) but is
definitely much closer to popular democracy than the present
situation.

It is claimed that this plan would preserve the politi
cal balance between the urban and rural interests.

This assump

tion is undeniable since the automatic system does nothing to

change the constituencies of electors.

However, in light of

recent Supreme Court decisions concerning reapportionment, this
fact seems to be of diminishing importance.

The automatic system does propose a minimal change and

does preserve the basic nature of the present system and the

principal of federalism.

The system has had the full support of

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and yet has never gained wide
spread support in or out of Congress.

This fact arises because

the automatic plan does not rectify enough of the evils in the

present system to be worth the effort of passing it and at the
same time actually magnifies (in the eyes of reformers) many of
the evils in the present system.

Arguments Against the Automatic Vote System
Critics of the automatic vote system offer the following
.

arguments:

40
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1.

The automatic system does not achieve reform in depth.

2.

This method would preserve the unit rule system with
all of its inequities and dangers and actually freezes
it into the Constitution.

3.

The adoption of the automatic system would serve as an
obstacle to any meaningful reform in the near and

possibly distant future.

4.

The possibility of having a minority President would
not be eliminated under the automatic system.

5.

The results of the Presidential election could still

be affected by fraud and weather conditions.

6.

An automatic vote was not the intent of the founding
fathers; they did not forsee that the State would

automatically cast its electoral vote for the candi
date

7.

that carried it.

The automatic system would not eliminate the inequal
ities that exist under our present system relating to

voting qualifications and requirements established by
State

laws.

Comments

.•

This plan preserves the evils of the unit rule, does not

achieve reform in depth, and undoubtedly would serve as an obstacle
to any meaningful reform in the future.

For those interested in a

compromise solution to the present problems this plan would be
acceptable since it does alleviate some of the inequities in the

present system but..for those interested in a sweeping reform this
plan would not be of much value.

Since it would be an impediment
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to future reform this author believes that the automatic system

would be worse than having no reform at all.

This plan does "not eliminate the possibility of minority
Presidents and still retains the possibility of electing a Pres
ident and a Vice President from different political parties.
This would probably not be healthy for the country.

Another

unhealthy aspect of this- plan is that it would still allow Pres
idential elections to be severely affected by fraud and weather

conditions.

(This line of reasoning has been analyzed previously.)

It is also unrealistic to discuss the intent of the

founding fathers since they left the plan open to custom and
accident and never really knew how the system would work.

The disparity which exists in the voting qualifications

and requirements in the several States would not be eliminated by
the automatic vote system.

But to abrogate such differences would

constitute a violation of our federal principal.

Each State has the

authority to establish its voter qualifications as long as they
are not contrary to the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.

Should the federal government under any reform plan be permitted
to deny this right to the States?

Opponents have also said that the automatic system incor
porated such minor changes that it might never have a bearing on
any election.

"Indeed," said Senator Ervin on the Senate floor,

"it is hardly worth cranking up the complex and protracted amend

ment process to accomplish so little —

it would be almost like

chasing a fly with an elephant gun."
41
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The death knell for the automatic system was apparently
sounded on May 18, 1966, when Senator Birch Bayh, the Constitu

tional Amendments Subcommitte chairman and chief Senate sponsor
of the Administration's plan, announced he was abondoning it in

favor of direct popular vote of the people.42
42
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SECTION

II

THE DISTRICT PLAN

Proposals to Reform the Present System

The District Plan

The district plan would preserve the person and the office

of the elector, although the electors would be pledged to specific
candidates, and the Electoral College would be kept intact.

How

ever, it would eliminate the practise of giving a State's entire
electoral vote to one candidate as is done under the unit vote

system.

A number of electors, equivalent to each State's number

of Representatives and Senators in Congress would be chosen by
the voters — one for each Congressional or similar district and

two for the State at large in congruence to the two Senators of

each State.

The geographical lines of these districts would be

set by the State legislatures, and they would not have to be
identical to their present Congressional districts.,- Every voter

would vote for three electors — one from the district and two

statewide candidates.

In each electoral district, the Presidential

candidate receiving the most popular votes would win that district's
electoral vote and the Presidential candidate receiving a plurality
of the State's total popular vote would win the two electoral votes

of the State.

The Presidential candidate receiving a majority of

all the electoral votes would be elected President.

If no candi

date received a majority of the electoral vote, the Senate and

House of Representatives (with each member having one vote) voting

as a single body would choose the President from the persons having
the three highest numbers of electoral votes.

If no person for
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Vice President had a majority of electoral votes, the Vice Pres

ident would be chosen in the same manner.

A quorum would be

three-fourths of the total number of Senators and Representatives
and a majority of the whole number would be necessary for election.
In the 84th Congress, the district plan became known as
the Mundt-Coudert Plan, named after Senator Karl. E. Mundt of

South Dakota and former Representative Frederic R. Coudert, Jr.,

from New York.4 3
This proposal to divide each State into separate districts

for the casting of electoral votes was first made by Representative

John Nicholas of Virginia on March 14, 1800, and was the subject
of extensive debate in Congress and the State legislatures during

the first decades of the nineteenth century.

A significant minority

(though never a majority) of the States employed the system during
the first few elections and is was last used by Michigan in the

election of 1892.44 The major backing for the district system has
always come from those who saw the general ticket or unit vote
system of casting electoral votes as the chief evil of the Ameri

can electoral system.45 James Madison has been quoted as saying
that the district system was the one "mostly if not exclusively,

in view when the Constitution was formed and adopted."46
43 .
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Advantages of the District Plan

The following are the major arguments given in support

of the district plan:4*?
1.

Under the district system, popular votes would tend
to be reflected more clearly and accurately than
under our present system.

2.

The district method would apply the same principles

of representation, and thus political pressure, that
apply in the election of members of Congress to
Presidential elections.

3.

This method would eliminate the "unpledged" elector

by having each elector pledge his support to a can
didate previous to the general election.
4.

The political importance of large States would be
diminished because the unit vote system would be
abolished and this would cause the major parties
to seek more electoral votes from all

States —

large and small.

5.

This plan would be more favorable for, and offer
encouragement to, the establishment and maintenance
of a well-organized two-party system.

6.

The influence of organized minorities in metropol
itan areas would be reduced to their actual numbers

in the population of those areas.

47Peirce, People's President, pp. 152-64.
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7.

By preserving the electors, the district method
would not involve any threat to the role of the
State in the Presidential election; our basic

principle of the federal system would be preserved.
8.

Each voter,

regardless of where he lived, would

vote for two at-large State electors and one dis
trict elector, thus giving equal weight, based on
population, to both rural and urban interests.
9.

This system would establish a uniform method of

choosing Presidential electors.

Comments

Proponents of this plan claim that it would alleviate

the most notable inequity of the present system —
take-all" concept.
the small States

the "winner-

However, this is only partially valid since

(those with three electoral votes)

be employing the unit plan.

would still

The two votes corresponding to each

State's two Senators are dependent on each candidate's state
wide vote totals and in small States with only one Representa

tive the one remaining electoral vote would also be dependent
on the statewide vote as this

is

"the district."

This would

probably give the small States a slight advantage in the poli
tical arena as they would still enjoy the power of the unit vote
plan.

One definite shortcoming of this plan is that a voter

would continue to

"waste"

his vote

if the candidate he

favored

failed to carry either his district or the State as a whole.

These possibilities cast much doubt on the argument that the
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district system would reflect the popular vote more clearly and
accurately than the present system.

If the same principles of representation were applied

to the election of the President and Congressional Representa
tives it would soon become apparent that both candidates would

be succumbing to the same political pressures.

This would go

far to promote "party responsibility" but would be a clear vio
lation of our

"checks and balances"

doctrine.

The candidates for electors would have to pledge their
support to their party's choice for President and Vice President.
This pledge would supposedly eliminate the independence of elec
tors and the unpledged elector (according to the Supreme Court

decision in Ray v. Blair, 342 U.S.

214

(1952), upholding the

policy that it is constitutional for a party to force its candi
date for elector to pledge his support to his party's candidates).

However, the feasibility of enforcing such a plege is doubtful
and will be discussed later.

With the probability of dividing the electoral votes of
the large States, which presently cast huge blocks of electoral
votes, there would be a reduction in the power they now have to
exert excessive political influences.

This would also lessen

the importance of choosing a Presidential candidate from one
of these key States.

In addition, as opposed to the present

situation, would be the unlikely fact that large States would
continue to carry undue weight in the development of national
party platforms or that they would claim disproportionate

attention during the campaign.
tance of reaching all

This would elevate the impor

(or as many as possible) the States during
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,

the campaign as Richard Nixon did during the 1960 Presidential
campaign.

This would be rough on the candidates but good for

the country -- after all, the President is_ President for all
the people.

Interestingly enough, the district system would

have brought about the election of Nixon over Kennedy in 19 60

by an electoral vote count of 278 votes to 245 votes —
cut Electoral College victory.

a clear-
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Proponents who stress the fact that the district system

would preserve or even strengthen the two-party system are using
this for the most part to discredit the proportional plan (to be
discussed later) whereby each vote cast for a third or splinter

party candidate, within the State, receives full credit for
these votes in the Electoral College.

Under the district system

a third or splinter party candidate would have to, at least, win
a district in order to receive any credit in the Electoral College
vote.

The role of the States would be threatened because the

unit rule would no longer be in effect.

However, the crux of

this argument concerns the retainment of federalism and this
principle would not be altered —

each State would continue to

have the same number of electors as they presently have.

The influence of minority groups would probably be
reduced to their actual numbers in the population, thus elimin

ating their overall impact in determining the destiny of the
statewide electoral vote as is claimed they now do.
n O

Peirce, People's President, p. 163.

Splinter
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groups would have influence only within their electoral districts

and their degree of influence would depend upon how well they were
organized and the amount of pressure they were able to exert as a
concentrated body of districts.

The voices of minorities would

seldom be heard in Presidential elections unless they could find
a new method to adequately express themselves and let their views
be known.

Both the rural and urban districts would vcte for only
three electors as previously explained.

This would give equal

weight to each vote in all areas and would be in accord with

the "one-man, one-vote" principle established by the Supreme
Court.

Arguments Against the District Plan

The district plan has been criticized for the following
reasons:

49
A

1.

Election of the President under the district plan
would not necessarily reflect more clearly or accu
rately the results of the popular vote.

2.

The district system would not automatically convert
the election of an elector into an electoral vote

for a particular candidate.

3.

The adoption of this plan could result in the exis
tence of two separate, distinct districts within a

State, one Congressional and one electoral.

4.
49

The district method would lead to gerrymandering of
Tienken, Proposals to Reform, pp. 89-93
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electoral districts.

5.

The system might tend to overweight and unduly favor
the political power of the rural and small-town areas.

6.

Minority group influence would be intentionally reduced
under this method.

7.

"Splinter" parties would concentrate their efforts in
a few districts in every State in order to shift the

balance of power in close national elections with

the hope of throwing the election into Congress where
their voice would have more weight.

8.

Presidential campaigns would be concentrated in

marginal districts, as opposed to the present contration in large pivotal States, resulting in even
more expensive Presidential campaigns.

9.

The district plan would not eliminate the possibil

ity of placing a minority President in the White
House.

Comments

Under the district plan the votes of the loser in each
district are disregarded just as they are now under the present

system.

Thus the disfranchisement argument, which has been dis

cussed previously, crops up immediately and with a good amount

of validity.

Since the district system operates at the micro-

level just like the present system operates at the macro-level,
the evils of the unit rule are just being weakened but not

destroyed.

So, in actuality, the unit rule retains its vitality
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but in a smaller dimension.

Each electoral vote in each dis

trict would go to the candidate receiving a plurality of the
popular vote and this would allow a minority President to win.
It would be less probable under the district system than it

is now but not impossible.

This could happen if the candi

date won most of his electoral votes by slim majorities or

pluralities, while his main opponent received a large number
of his electoral votes by huge margins.

It could also happen

if the winner drew disproportionate support from low-population
States or States with low voter turnout ratios where there are
fewer voters for each electoral vote.

In a 1952 Supreme Court decision (Ray v. Blair), the
Court upheld an Alabama practise (of the Democratic Executive

Committe) whereby candidates for elector were required to pledge
to support the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates of

the party's national convention as a condition to being certi
fied as a candidate in the Democratic primary.

But the Court

did not rule on the constitutionality of State laws that require
electors to vote for their party's candidates, or indicate
whether elector pledges, even if given, could be enforced.

The

preponderance of legal opinion seems to be that statutes binding
electors, or pledges that they may give, are unenforceable.

The

view of James C. Kirby, Jr., an expert on Electoral College law,
is:

If an elector chooses to incur party and community
wrath by violating his trust, and voting for someone
other than his party's candidate, it is doubtful if

there is any practical remedy.50
50 Peirce,

People's President, pp. 125-126.
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One major complaint that this author has regarding this

plan is that it could and probably would result in two separate,
distinct districts within a State, one Congressional and one
electoral.

This would be confusing for the voters and would

probably cause a multitude of administrative (registration, etc.)
problems.

Furthermore, this would probably result in another

exercise of gerrymandering.

If one party were predominant.in a

State the legislature' could gerrymander the electoral districts
even though such districts were "compact and contiguous" terri
tories.

Large metropolitan areas would be especially vulnerable

to this sort of thing and rurally dominated legislatures would
be keenly aware of this fact.

This applies equally well to an

urban dominated legislature that could easily divide the rural
vote making it ineffective.

Thus the balance of political power

could sway to either the rural or urban interests, depending upon

which interest controlled the State legislature.
It is argued that "splinter" parties would concentrate

their efforts in a few districts in every State in order to shift
the balance of power so as to throw the election into Congress
where they would supposedly have a stronger voice in deciding the
selection of a President.

However, this is at least unlikely

since "splinter" parties at present rarely muster up enough
strength to elect their candidate in a Congressional race.
Campaign costs are soaring higher with each election and

it is doubtful if this plan would really skyrocket the costs of a
campaign as much as critics argue.

They claim that more money

would be needed because campaigns would become concentrated in

marginal districts as opposed to their present concentration in
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pivotal States.

If the campaigns would shift as is predicted

it would seem that the candidates could use the money saved

from less campaigning in pivotal areas and apply it to their
new marginal campaign.

If campaigns did shift in this manner, it would seem

that, more importantly, there could be a shift of emphasis

from national issues to local issues.

This shift in emphasis

would have an adverse affect for the nation because the Presi

dency is a national office and not a local office.

The greatest problem facing the district system is a

political one.

Members of Congress of both sides of the aisle

realize that they could reap political advantages from this
plan but realize also that it could backfire.
licans and Democrats are leary of this plan.

Thus, both Repub
Another, and

probably the largest, major hurdle in the path of this plan is

that it is regarded with much distaste by the large and nearlarge States.

This would paralyze the strongest muscle in

their political bodies —

the unit plan —

while at the same

time preserving, or possibly even increasing, the present
strength of the small States.

Thus it seems that this plan

for reforming the Electoral College is destined for failure
for lack of the necessary political support.

SECTION

THE

III:

PROPORTIONAL

PLAN

Proposals to Reform the Present System

The Proportional Plan

The proportional plan for choosing a President would
retain the constitutionally mandated apportionment of electors
to the States,based on their representation in Congress, but
would divide each State's electoral vote to relfect the share

of the popular vote for President cast by the voters of the
State. The plan was first introduced in Congress by Representa

tive William T. Lawrence of New York on December 11, 194 8.51
This plan would eliminate the present "winner take all"

system and would give the Presidency to the candidate winning
the most electoral votes throughout the nation.

Electors would

be eliminated and each candidate would automatically receive
the same percentage of the state's electoral vote as he had re

ceived in the popular vote statistics.

Some plans would give

the Presidency to the plurality candidate but most require a
certain minimum percentage (usually forty percent).

The propor

tional electoral vote for each State is determined by multiplying
the number of popular votes a candidate has received by the

State's electoral vote allotment and then dividing the sum de
rived by the total popular vote of the State. If no candidate

received the minimum percentage necessary for an outright victory,
the House and Senate sitting jointly and voting as individuals

would choose the President from the two candidates having the

5llbid., p. 164.
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highest number of electoral votes.

The Vice President would

be elected in the same manner and at the same time.

The early

plans rounded fractions so as to keep the electoral vote in
whole numbers, but modern plans have carried out fractional
votes three decimal places and fractional numbers of less than

one-thousandth would be disregarded unless such computations

would change the result of the election.

The proportional plan

is other called the "Lodge-Gassett" plan in honor of its two
most ardent advocates —

fromer Senator from Massachusetts,

Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., and former Representative from Texas,
Ed Lee

Gassett.

Another similar plan is known as the Daniel Substitute
Plan.

In 19 56 it was offered on the Senate floor as an amend

ment to the Lodge-Gassett plan when proponents of the propor

tional plan joined forces with proponents of the district plan.
The amendment permitted each State to adopt either the

district plan or the proportional plan.

Under this plan, a

State could distribute its electoral votes among the three top

candidates according to their statewide popular vote; or, if

the State Legislature preferred, the electors could be chosen
as senators and Representativesare now chosen —

two by state

wide vote and the rest by Congressional districts.52
This plan was highly popular at first but never attained
the sufficient two-thirds vote (Constitutional amendment)for

passage and is rarely mentioned anymore.

52

•

Tienken, Proposals to Reform,

pp.

98-99.
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Senator John Kennedy (1956) discredited the Daniel
Substitute by saying:
The two schemes joined together by this shot
gun wedding ... are wholly incompatible, the
sponsors of each having thoroughly and accu
rately assailed the merits of the other over
the years.
The Mundt proposal multiples the
general ticket system; the Daniel proposal
abolishes it.
The Mundt proposal continues the
importance of States as units for electoral

purposes; the Daniel proposal reduces it. And
yet it is now proposed that the Senate, being
unable to give its approval to either system,
should lump them together and give each State
its choice.
No surer method of introducing
confusion and loss of public confidence in
our electoral system could be divised.
Thus the Daniel plan was discredited and has never recovered.

For purposes of further analysis only the Lodge-Gassett propos'
al will be considered.

Advantages of the Proportional Plan

The following arguments are used in favor of the Proportional Plan:

1.

Proportionate distribution is the nearest approach

to electing a President by direct popular vote while
retaining and preserving the present strength of
each state in the election of the President(the idea
of Federalism).

2.

For all practical purposes it would be virtually
impossible to have a President that received less
votes than his chief opponent.

53lbid., pp. 108-116.
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3.

Voter participation would be encouraged because
every vote would count.

Popular votes for the

losing candidates would no longer be "wasted."
4.

There would be a more equal balance of power among
the States because the unit vote system would be
abolished.

5.

The proportional plan would, strengthen the two-

party system; the opposition party would be encour
aged in one-party States because every vote would
have some effect in the national election.

6.

Unfavorable weather conditions, fraudulent voting

practises, and accidental circumstances would be
unlikely to defeat the choice of the people under
the proportional system.

7.

Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates could
be selected from a broader base because the necessity

of a candidate coming from a large State would be
diminished.

Comments

The genius of the proportional plan is that it does come

very close to direct popular election while at the same time
it preserves the relative strength of the States in the electoral
system.

It eliminates the much hated unit vote so that every

man's vote counts, while at the same time preserving the idea
of Federalism but in a slightly weaker position.

It is a brilliant

compromise measure that would abolish many of the evils of the

-59-

present system which would please the liberals and at the

same time leave

room for acceptance by the conservative

States' rightists.

This plan would virtually eliminate the possibility of

electing a minority President.

There would be a slim possibil

ity, because of the perversion factor resulting from the "Sen
atorial" electoral votes but since every man's vote would count

(as opposed to the huge blocks of wasted votes for the losing
candidate which are disregarded under the present system) it

would be highly unlikely.

This factor would also probably

increase voter participation.

Since their votes would no longer

be wasted, Republicans in the South would be more likely to make
an effort to vote and Democrats realizing this would redouble

their efforts to get their voters to the polls.
South" would no longer be solid.

Thus, the "solid

This same influence would also

take place in the Republican Midwest.

This, in turn, would pro

bably result in a strengthening of the two-party system since
every vote would count.

"However, as long as the winning can

didate had to have more electoral votes than any other candi-

date, parties would not be likely to multiply rapidly."54

The

provision in the proposed amendment requiring election by at
least forty percent of the total electoral vote would help to
check any tendency towards breakdown of the two-party system.
It would also reduce the possibilities of the election being

thrown into the Congress through the efforts of minor parties

since it would require them to secure at least twenty percent
54

Ibid., pp. 108-116.
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of the electoral vote to do

so.

Since no State would control huge blocks of electoral

votes, as they now do because of the unit rule system, it would
tend to balance the power among the States.

This fact would also

tend to diminish the present importance of inclement weather and

fraudulent voting practises since these factors could no longer
influence the entire electoral vote in a State, but only a small
proportion of it.

The abolishment of the unit vote system would

also decrease the importance of selecting Presidential and Vice
Presidential candidates from large pivotal States for reasons
similar to those discussed under the district plan.
Senator Thomas

H.

Kuchel of California has

stated what

is probably one of the best single statements in favor of the pro
portional plan.

He said, "a proportional system undeniably pro

vides the best reflection of popular desire in the framework of a

federal system that retains the States as voting units."55

Disadvantages of the Proportional Plan

Critics of the proportional plan find the following
flaws

in it:

1.

Proportionate distribution of the electoral vote

would weaken the power of the major parties because
it would be easier for minor parties to win a number
of the electoral

2.
55

votes.

The proportional plan provides no positive assurance

Peirce, People's President, p. 175.
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that the will of the people would prevail in every
Presidential election.

3.

Undue political importance might be given to States
having the least voters relative to electoral votes.

4.

This plan would permit a candidate that only received
a plurality of the electoral vote to be elected Pres

ident; the present system requires a candidate to
procure a majority of the electoral vote to become
President.

5.

The abolition of the Presidential electors may
create some problem by eliminating the flexibility
that exists in our present system.

6.

States would no longer have importance as single
units in the Presidential election

if the proportional

plan were adopted.
7.

The Constitution should not be amended

unless it

would be certain that the general welfare of the
people will benefit from it.

o

Comments

It is generally agreed that the two-party system has

helped to unify the United States and. has thereby strengthened
the country.

Opponents of the proportional plan fear that, if

implemented, this plan would lead to a splintering of the pre
sently strong two-party system because minority groups would be

able to obtain electoral votes.

This argument has been pre

viously discussed, but there are other dangerous possibilities
which have not.

Robert L.

Tienken has

stated that:
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Proportionate distribution might result in less
activity by the major parties to unify diverse
political groups.
The existing electoral system
gives the major political parties an incentive
to seek the votes of minority groups in key
States.
It helps to assure that the legitimate
interests of these groups will be represented.
As long as both major parties give recognition
to the interests of minority groups, the members
of such groups have little incentive to rally
behind extremists and form special interst blocs

or parties.
The proportional plan, be reducing
the political importance of minority groups in
large, doubtful States, would make it possible
for the major parties to give less attention to
the interests of minor groups -- whether econo
mic, sectional, national, religious, or racial.
While some of these minorities may now seem to
command more than their share of attention, it

would be undesirable for national unity if any
of these groups were to be systematically under-

represented. 56
This is certainly possible, but not probable under this

plan, because a party would need as many votes as it could procure
in order to win the election.

Under this plan every vote counts

toward a victory because the unit would be abolished.

The proportional plan does not positively assure that
the will of the people would be carried out in every election,
but there is no way that this could be guaranteed.

This plan comes

closer to this ideal than all other plans excluding the direct
election method and even it could be shipwrecked because of cer
tain circumstances

(such as fraud).

States with a small population would have a slight
advantage because of the minimum of three electoral votes per

State.

Based on the 196 0 census, thirty-five States and the

District of Columbia are technically "over-represented in the

6Tienken, Proposals to Reform, pp. 117-118.
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Eiectoral College and fourteen States are under-represented."57
(SeeeAppendix C.) However, these statistics are based on the
total population of each State and not on actual voter partici

pation which varies throughout the country. The only way in
which perfect representation could be achieved would be through
the implementation of the direct popular vote.

The argument against allowing a plurality candidate

to assume office is for the most part ungrounded. With the abo
lition of the unit rule it would be much more difficult to attain
an Electoral College majority. Furthermore, under the present

system acandidate who received only a plurality under the pro
portional plan could very likely have carried more of the popu
lar vote than another candidate who received a majority of the
electoral vote.

In the past, electors have at times introduced a use

ful element of flexibility into the election process. In 1912,
Theodore Roosevelt's electors could declare, before the election,
that if Roosevelt could not win, then they would vote for Taft
instead of Wilson. If electoral votes were retained purely for

counting purposes, it would not be possible to make such commitments.

°

Opponents of the proportional plan claim that States
would lose their importance as single units in Presidential elec

tions. From their point of view, this is correct since the unit
vote system would perish. .However, they are failing to realize
57Peirce, People's President, p. 138.

58Tienken, Proposals to Reform,'p. 120.
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another important aspect of this plan.

Senator Joseph S. Clark

of Pennsylvania has speculated that:
The South —

now happily not so solid —

would

acquire an even greater importance in the Dem
ocratic Party under this scheme because the
monolithic nature of its one-party vote in a

general election would give nearly all of its
Electoral college votes to the Democratic nom
inee. Of course, he usually gets them all any

way under the present system, but they are more
than offset by the votes of the big doubtful
States where a small majority carries all the
State's electoral vote. Similarly, the con
servative one-party Republican States where
Democratic office holders are uncommon, such

as Kansas, Nebraska, and Vermont, would have
their stature within the Republican Party

magnified.59

Thus this argument is not completely true since some

States would retain a large amount of importance as single units.
That the Constitution should not be amended unless it

would be certain that the general welfare of the people will bene

fit from it is a rather distasteful statement in the opinion of
this author.

This statement is of such nebulous character that

it hardly merits discussion. First, who decides what the general
welfare of the people is, and secondly, who could ever be certain
that any proposal would guarantee benefits for the people? Time
is the only element that would determine this.

The Lodge-Gossett proposal was passed by the Senate in
1950 with the required two-thirds majority but could not get

through the House.

It was revived again in the Senate in 1956

and this time it received its death certificate.

The opposition

was led by Senators Douglas of Illinois and Kennedy of Massachusetts.
59Joseph Clark, Congress:

The Sapless Branch, pp. 221-223
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In view of this, there is some irony in the
fact that the opposition that defeated the

Lodge-Gossett amendment was superbly led by
the man who might four years later have been
the victim of the anachronistic Electoral

College —

the junior (and freshman) Senator

from Massachusetts,

John F.

Kennedy.

He

skillfully led the attack that not only sent
it back to committee, never again to emerge,

but won away many of its sponsors.60
60 Oliver

Jensen, American Heritage, p. 96.

SECTION

THE

DIRECT

IV:

ELECTION PLAN

Proposals to Reform the Present System
The Direct Election Plan

The direct election plan was first introduced by Repre

sentative William McMannis of New York in 182661 and would func
tion as its name suggests —

the people of the United States

would vote directly for the President.

This is., the only plan

that would elect the President and Vice President by a nation
wide popular vote.

It would abolish the office of elector, the

Electoral College, the unit vote system, and the possibility of
contingent elections in the House and Senate for the President

and Vice President respectively.

As opposed to the^; other

reform plans, the direct election plan would provide for a

runoff election between the two persons who received the great
est number of votes cast for President but did not receive a

majority.

However, a substantial number of proposals would

require only a forty percent plurality in order to win in the
general election.

Advantages of the Direct Election Plan

The advantages of the direct election plan are as follows: 62
1.

The direct election plan would abolish the unit vote

62Peirce, People's President, pp. 253-254.
Proposals to Reform, ppl 49-62.

Teinken,
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system and substitute direct election which would
eliminate the massive disfranchisement of the min

ority voters in each State.
2.

Direct election would have more appeal to the

people thus encouraging more voter participation.
3.

The American people would actually and legally
elect the President and Vice President instead

of merely "appointing" electors to express their
wishes.

4.

The one-man, one-vote doctrine would apply to the
election of the President as it now applies to

Congress and the State legislatures.
5.

There would no longer be the chance that the man

who won the most popular votes could be deprived

of the Presidency through the mathematical vagaries
of the Electoral College.

6.

Direct election would abolish the confusing ballots
which contain the names of the President and Vice

President and/or the electors since there would no
longer be electors.

7.

This plan would strengthen the two-party system —

especially in one-party States because the unit plan
would not be in effect.

8.

Minority groups would have political power equal to
their actual membership numbers and could no longer

exert undue pressure in the political system.
9.

Presidential candidates would be legally elected on

election day, thus eliminating the delay between

election day and the day the electors cast their

-69votes.

10.

The election of President and Vice President would
never devolve into Congress because a runoff elec

tion would be held if no candidate received a suf
ficient number of popular votes to be elected.
11.

Fraudulent practises and weather conditions would
have little or no effect on the outcome of the
election.

12.

There would be less necessity of selecting candi
dates from the large pivotal States.

Comments

This is the only proposal plan that would make every
man's vote of equal weight with every other man's vote.

This

plan eliminates the unit vote with all of its inequities but
of even greater importance is the fact that it completely

ignores the federal principle.

States would lose all signi

ficance as voting units- and this would completely establish

the one-man, one-vote principle in its purest form.

Opponents

of this plan claim that this denies the principle of federalism

which is one of the most basic elements of American democracy.
However, opponents counter this claim with their own logic:
Why,

for some mysterious reason connected with

federalism, should the votes of men from Wyoming
and New Hampshire be given more weight than the
votes of mentfrom New York and California —

or possibly the reverse?

How would these inequal

ities be explained in the day of one-man, one-vote?63
Peirce, People's President, p. 266.
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This is what completely differentiates this plan from all the
other proposed reforms.

Direct election would appeal to the people because every

man's vote would count and count equally with every other man's.

This would encourage and increase voter participation.

Since

electors would be -eliminated, the confusing ballots including
the names of electors would also perish.

Under this plan the American people would legally elect
their President instead of appointing electors to do it for them

This would completely eliminate the possibility of an intermed

iary body depriving the people of their choice of President.

Proponents of this plan claim that these factors in conjunction
with the abolition of the unit vote plan would strengthen the

two-party system.

This is probably correct because every vote

cast in every State would be equally weighted.

This would be

especially beneficial to the minority electorate in one-party
States and follows much of the reasoning discussed more thor

oughly in the section concerning the proportional plan.
Minority groups would lose their ability to swing the
entire electoral vote of a State and would therefore encounter

a reduction in political power.

However,.they probably would

not lose an unduly amount of power because most politicians
would want to include their wishes in their political platforms

in order to receive as many votes as possible.

Even under the

present electoral system there is the possibility that both

major parties could systematically exclude certain minorities
from their platforms — but they do not and there is no reason
to believe that this practise would begin under any system.
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Many Americans now think that the President is legally
elected in the popular election in November.

However, under

the present system this is untrue as the real election takes

place when the electors meet and cast their votes.

This delay

is confusing to the people and could result in serious problems
if certain situations arose.

For instance, no one is quite sure

as to what the electors would or could legally do if the Presi
dent were to die before the electors met to cast their votes.

This delay would also present serious practical problems in a

disputed election.

Neither candidate would know for sure who

would be President until December when the electors would meet

and cast their votes and this would give the new President very

little time to take care of such important matters as choosing
his Cabinet members.

At present the contingent election takes

place in the House of Representatives if no candidate receives
the necessary majority in the Electoral College vote.

The first

three reform plans discussed would place this contingent elec

tion into a joint session of Congress with each member having
one vote.

Proponents of the direct election plan feel this is

much too undemocratic and open to corruption and this is why

they have provided for a runoff election between the top two

vote recipients in cases where no one candidate receives the
necessary number of votes in the general election.
The last two arguments are again related to the States

as units and the current use of the unit plan.

With a shift

of importance away from these factors and to the people fraud
ulent voting practises and inclement weather candidates would
have little effect in the results of the election.

There would
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also be less emphasis placed on choosing the candidates from

large States since they would no longer pad their vote totals
with this large number of electoral votes from "back home."

An outstanding argument in favor of the direct election

proposal has been eloquently expressed by Neal Pierce in his
book The People's President:

Democratic elections do not always guarantee that
the best man will win.

Even when we have shed the

barnacles of the electoral college from the ship
of state, there is no guarantee that we or our
descendants may not one day elect a charlatan or an

ideologue to the Presidency.

For all our talk of

great American Presidents, we have elected some
pretty grim mediocrities to that office, and we
could again — although the modern levels of

education and political sophistication in the
United States today make it far less likely.
But
even when one admits that the vox populi may err,
the fact remains that through our entire national
experience we have learned that there is no safer,
no better way to elect our public officials than
by the choice of the people, with the man who wins
the most votes being awarded the office.
This is
the essence of "the consent of the governed." And
no matter how wisely or foolishly the American

people choose their President, he is_ their Presi
dent.
No one has been able to show how the pre
servation of a quaint 18th-century voting device,
the electoral college, with all its anomalies and
potential "wild cards," can serve to protect the
Republic.
The choice of the Chief Executive must
be the people's, and it should rest with none
other than them.64

Arguments Against Direct Election

Opponents of the direct election plan criticize it for

the following reasons:^
1.

It is possible that direct election would lead to

64Ibid., p. 297.
65

:
The American Bar Association, The Case for Direct Popular
Election of the President and Vice President of the United States,
(Washington, February, 1967), p. 3.
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an increase in the number of "splinter" parties.

2.

Direct election might impair the "unifying" function
of the two major parties.

3.

Direct election would deprive small and sparsely
populated States of the slight advantage they enjoy
through the distribution of electoral votes according

to the size of Congressional delegation.
4.

Direct election of the President could result in

enlarged federal control over political parties and

replace the existing system of parties being regu
lated mainly by State law.

5.

This proposal, if adopted, could seriously impair

the principle of federalism which is one of the
most basic elements of American democracy.
6.

With direct election,
"electoral entities"

7.

the States would cease to be
in the choice of President.

Campaigning would continue to be concentrated in
metropolitan areas and cities in large States, and
would perpetuate the current practise of ignoring
rural communities

8.

and the

small

States.

The importance and relative weight of each State's

vote would no longer depend upon population but
rather upon the number of votes cast.
9.

It is

doubtful

that the direct election amendment

would be approved by the necessary two-thirds vote
in both Houses of Congress and ratified by threeo

fourths of the

States.
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Comments

The American Bar Association has conducted an in depth

study of the Electoral College and has published a report in
favor of the direct election plan.

In this report the conclu

sion was reached that the implementation of the direct vote

would neither damage the two-party system nor encourage the

growth of "splinter" parties.^6
The small States now enjoy a slight mathematical advan

tage in their number of electors per population.

However, it

is highly debatable as to whether or not this is meaningful
in a system that places so much emphasis on the large blocks
of electoral votes that large States possess.

One of the greatest safeguards in our country against

the usurpation of power by the national government (away from
the States) is the dependence of national party structure on
State political organizations.

Opponents of the direct elec

tion plan fear that it would result in enlarged federal control

over political parties.

Neal Peirce has countered this argu

ment in his book The People's President by saying that there

would be little change in the existing power structure "as long
as the national convention method of nominating Presidential

candidates continues."67

Since there is little hope for nat

ional primaries and little reason to believe that States would

voluntarily give up this power it seems that this fear is
ungrounded.
67

.

Peirce, People's President, p. 278.
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Opponents of the direct election plan argue that it
would impair the principle of federalism.

This fear has been

one of the main arguments against the plan but again Neal

Peirce has eloquently rebuked this argument by saying:
For in truth, there are rich benefits for the

citizens of all the states stemming from fed
eralism in America. But they stem from entirely
different grounds: from the representation each
district and state enjoys in Congress, from the

right of each state to fashion governmental pol
icies particularly suited to its own citizens,
from the protections from overbearing federal
power which stem from the special rights of
the states under the Constitution.
If one wants
to preserve "states' rights" and the American

federal system, there are many better ways to
do so than by preserving the fictional advan

tages of the electoral college.68
From this analysis it'would seem that the doctrine of federalism

would be in little peril if the direct election plan were to be
implemented.

With direct election, the States would cease to be

"electoral entities" in the choice of President, but this can
be easily justified by the one-man, one-vote doctrine.

After

all, "it is people who have preferences, not States."69

Another ramification of this loss of "electoral entity" status

would be that the weight of each State's vote would no longer
depend upon population but upon the number of votes cast.

Is

this not the way it should be in order to comply with the
equitable one-man, one-vote doctrine?

Opponents of this plan, who obviously support the

district plan, claim that campaigns would continue to be concen
trated in metropolitan areas and cities in large States.

68Ibid.,*p. 264.
69Ibid., p. 263.

The
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district plan is the only plan that would force candidates

into the more remote areas of the country and this is because
candidates would have to construct a majority from the many

separate districts across the coutry.

This is probably a very

worthy idea but is overshadowed by the many shortcomings of the
district plan.

However, the direct vote plan would urge candi

dates to reach as many people as possible because every vote
in their favor would be valuable with the one-man, one-vote
doctrine

in effect.

The last and probably most pragmatic argument against
the direct election plan is a political one —

can proponents

of the direct election plan collect enough support to get this
plan approved?

Both large and small States feel that they have

a mathematical advantage under the present system and until
these are proven to be false there is little hope for its
However, the American Bar Association's report on

passage.

electoral reform is optimistic in its overwhelming support for
the direct election plan and seems to have the solution for
this political dilemna when it states:

The present system obviously cannot favor both
large and small States vis-a-vis each other.

One of the two opposing views must be unsound

in its premises.
But in the ascendency of oneman, one-vote, it is impossible to justify any
system on the grounds of voter inequality.
Both

arguments are unsound in principle.^0
70

'^American Bar Association, The Case for Direct Election,

p.

3.

PART V

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

This study has presented the Electoral College as an

element of the American political system.

The historical

background was presented in a realistic and factual manner
in order that the reader could understand how an undemocratic

institution such as the Electoral College became a reality in
a democratic country.

Here the word "realistic" was carefully

chosen so as not to discredit the founding fathers in the eyes

of the idealistic American people who firmly believe that they

(the founding fathers) were infallible.

It would be ludicrous

to debate the intelligence of the founding fathers in reference

to the Electoral College because they openly admitted at the

time they created this "sleeping monster" that they did not
know how, how well, or how long the plan would function effec

tively. They created a maleable structure that custom and time
would mold.

The point is, however, that the founding fathers

did not envision the Electoral College as one of the corner

stones of our governmental system, as they did "separation of

powers" and the system of "checks and balances." They purposely
injected a procedure for amending the Constitution if one of its
elements began to function improperly or unrealistically.

At

its inception the Electoral College was probably the best pos
sible method of electing a President in a large country with

poor modes of communication.

However, time has changed the

realities of our world and yet people claim that the Electoral

College is still the best method of choosing a President. This
author has presented and analyzed both the auguments in favor of
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and the arguments against the Electoral College system and

concludes that it is no longer an acceptable method.

It

contains too many inequities for the people that it serves;
such as the unit rule which counts one man's vote unequally

with another man's while at the same time actually disfran
chising millions of voters who voted for the candidate who

failed to carry their particular State, the undemocratic use

of intermediary electors, and finally the possibili-cy that
those

"faceless" intermediaries could be unfaithful and

neglect the desires of the people who chose them, and elect

an unwanted candidate.

This author feels that this system

should not be allowed to survive in today's world.

It is easy to criticize and offer nothing better, but
critics of the Electoral College have offered at least four
major proposals that would reform the present system.
plans include:

These

the automatic vote system, the district plan,

the proportional plan, and the direct election plan.
both pro and con —

The case —

for each of_the proposed election plans has

been presented; the arguments in favor of and the arguments

against each proposal have been stated and analyzed.

This author

feels that any of these four would be better than the present
system and some would be better than others.

The automatic vote plan would reform the present system
in that it would eliminate the possibility of faithless electors.

However, this is the only major reform that would take place
under this plan and it would actually incorporate the rest of
the evils of the present system into its operation.

This author

rejects the automatic vote system for this reason in conjunction
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with the fact that there are better plans being offered.
The district plan is also rejected by this author.
There are four reasons for this:

1.

Better plans have been offered.

2.

In many States it would cause unnecessary confu
sion for voters because States would be allowed

to use the present districts for Congressional
elections and create new ones for Presidential
elections.

3.

It would perpetuate the disfranchisement of voters

on the district level just as the present unit rule
disfranchises voters on a

4.

statewide basis.

It would continue to give unequal weight to votes
cast in different States because each State would

still be entitled to cast their current number of
electoral votes.

The proportional plan has also been rejected by this
author but only after a great amount of mental debate had

taken place.

It is basically very sound and very commendable.

It would abolish all but one of the evils of the present system
and that is the fact that it counts popular votes in different
States in differing weights
directed to Appendix C).

(here again the reader must be

However, it is debatable as to whether

or not this is actually an evil in the present system.

If this

author held uncompromising views concerning the nature and

relative importance of federalism he would not have found any
flaws in the proportional plan.

However, the normative judgment

was made and this author decided that the right of people to have
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their votes treated equally was more important than the loss

of power that States would endure if this plan were implemented.
Thus we come to the direct election plan which this
author feels to be the best and most equitable plan.

It would

abolish all of the evils of the present system and give an

equal voice to all of the people in selecting the President.
It must be this way because the power of the vote is a sacred

right of the people in a democratic nation.
This author's greatest dilemna was that this plan might
be an abuse to the federal system.

However, it was decided that

giving States certain mathematical advantages in the election of
the President was not an integral part of the federal system.

His greatest fear was that the direct election plan might result
in a great transfer of power from States to the federal govern
ment.

It is political parties that serve as a check on this

power and as long as they continue to remain active in the

political affairs of the States and continue to nominate Pres
idential candidates in the present fashion there is little to
fear.

There has always been a trend in America toward direct
democratic participation at every level.

It the early years of

the republic this may not have been predicted but it has pro

mulgated itself in the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.

It is now time to reiterate

that trend and provide for popular election of the President,
the last major office in the country over which the people
do not have a

direct vote.
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The future looks bright for this amendment.

It passed

in the House on September 18, 1969, by a vote of 339 to seventy.
President Nixon views this plan with favor and on September 30,
1969, he sent a request to the Senate stating:
I believe that contrary views are now a luxury -that the need for electoral reform is urgent

and should be our controlling consideration.

I hope therefore, that two-thirds of the Senate
will approve the House passed Amendment as

promptly as possible so that all of us together
can then urge the States also to give their
approval.72
This report must and will end with a prophecy and a

warning if this prophecy is never realized.

The author believes

that the direct election plan will be the next Constitutional
Amendment.

The electoral College is an archaic and undemocratic

structure that has become imbedded in our political system.

It

is not the only thing wrong in America today and it alone will
not destroy our country but if it and other things like it
continue to prosper they will eventually spell our doom. Here

it would be altogether proper and fitting to leave the reader
with a comment made by Sir Charles P. Snow in his famous
it

Rede lecture on "The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution:

I can't help thinking of the Venetian Republic in
their last half-centruy.
Like us, they had once
been fabulously lucky. They had become rich, as

" we did, by accident. They had acquired immense
political skill, just as we have. A good many of
them were toughminded, realistic, patriotic men. . .
Many of them gave their minds to working out ways
to keep going. It would have meant breaking the
pattern into which they had crystallized. They
were fond of the pattern just as we are fond of

ours.

They never found the will to break it.73

73Clark, Congress: The Sapless Branch, p. 249.

APPENDIX

Appendix A

Twelve States That Can Elect A President:

State

74

Electoral

Votes

New York

43

California

*

40

Pennsylvania

29

Ohio

26

Illinois

26

Texas

25

Michigan

21
•.

New Jersey
Florida

:

17
14

Massachusetts

14

Indiana

13

Alaska

3

Total

.

74Peirce, People's President, pp. 313-314.
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271

Appendix B

Minority Presidents (Those Who Received Less Than 50% of the Popular Vote)

OPPONENTS

ELECTED

YEAR

Name

Percent

Percent

Name

Name

Percent

Clay

13.2

48.1

Birney

2233

Cass

42.5

Van Buren

10.1

1824....J.Q. Adams

31.9

Jackson

1844

Polk

49.6

Clay

1848

Taylor

.47.3

.42.2

1856... .Buchanan

45.6

Fremont

33.3

Filmore

21.1

1860... .Lincoln

39.8

Douglas

29.4

Breckinridge

18.2

.47.9

Tilden

50.9

1876

Hayes

1880

Garfield

Name

Crawford

Percent

13 .1

SSmith

0.1

Bell

12.6

.48.2

Weaver

3.4

Others

0.1

Blaine

48.3

Butler

1.7

St. John...

1.5

Cleveland

48.6

Fisk

2.2

Others

,1.2

47.8

46.0 .

B. Harrison

43.0

Weaver

8.5

Others.

.2.4

1892....Cleveland
Wilson

41.9

T. Roosevelt

27.4

Taft

Debs

.6.0

1912

Wilson

49.3

Hughes.

46.1

Benson

3.2

Others.. . .

.1.5

1916

49.6

Dewey

45.1

Thurmond

2.4

H. Wallace

.2.4

1948... .Truman

49.3

Unpledged.

0.9

.0.3

49.5

Nixon

Others....

1960... .Kennedy

48.3

Hancock

1884....Cleveland

48.5

1888....B. Harrison

Note:

Peirce, Peoples President,

pp. 304 - 307
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Appendix C

Ratio of Electoral Votes to Population in Eack State axd ties

Distiuct of Columbia for 1064 and 1963 Presidential Elections

(Based on I9G0 Census)
Ra nk and State

1. Alaska
2.

Nevada

G.

Wyoming

4. Vermont

5. Delaware
0.

New Hampshire

7. North Dakota
8. Hawaii

9. Idaho

10. Montana
11, South Dakota

12. Rhode Island
13. Utah

14. New Mexico
is. Maine

16. District of Columbia
17. Arizona

IS.

West Virginia

19.

Nebraska

20. Oklahoma.
21. Colorado
22.

Oregon

23. Arkansas
2-1. South Carolina

25. Iowa

20.

27.

Maryland
Mississippi

Ratio

75.3S0
05,003
110,022
129,030
1-13,76-1
151,730
153,112
15S.193
100,793
163,092
170,129
2I4.S72
222,357
237,756
242,316
254.652
260,452
255,774
232,266
291,035
292,325
294,731

297,712
297,324
306,363

Ra nk and State

Ratio

23. Kansas

311,230
316,004

29. Connecticut

30.

Washington

317,024
324.2S1
325,702
326,674
323,533

31. Tennessee

32. Louisiana
33. Alabama
34.

Georgia
Virginia

329,315
330,579

National average

333,314

Kentucky

337,573
341,386
350,473
353.6S2
356,370
35S,654
359,334
367,753
372,533
373,325
3S3.187
337,735
3G0.2S3
300,323
392,030

35. Wisconsin
33.

37.

38. Minnesota
39. North Carolina
40. Florida
41.

New Jersey

42. Indiana
43. Missouri
vt.

Massachusetts

45.

Michigan

'|U.

:Ohio

47. Texas
43. Illinois
49. New York

Pennsylvania

310,069

50.

311,163;

51. California

\,
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